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I. INTRODUCTION 
Analysts expect more than 35 million smart phones will be sold in 
the United States in 2008, which represents an increase of seventy-seven 
percent from 2007.1  Smart phones, such as the BlackBerry and iPhone, 
allow people to use the Internet, send and receive e-mail, and store data.2  
These features allow people to be in constant and instant communication 
with their family, friends, and, particularly, the office.  The increasing 
prevalence of smart phones has repercussions for both employees and 
their employers as the separation between work and home becomes ever 
smaller.  Employees are now able to accomplish substantive work in the 
office, in the home, on the way to and from work, and just about any 
place else using the smart phone’s capabilities.  The smart-phone culture 
can infect the workplace, and both senior and junior employees may feel 
compelled to do work once they have left the office.3  As a result, 
employers are potentially liable for overtime compensation when non-
exempt employees use their smart phones to perform work-related tasks 
when they are off the clock.  The “non-exempt” label refers to employees 
who do not fall under the maximum hour exemptions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA).4 
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 1. Roger Cheng, Smart Phones Challenge Firms, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2008, at B10. 
 2. Roger Cheng, Personal Smartphones Pull Double Duty at Work—Use Saves Firms Money, 
But They Must Deal With Security Issues, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2008, at B7. 
 3. See Management Report—BlackBerry Addiction Starts at the Top, CIO MAG., Mar. 1, 
2007, available at http://www.cio.com/article/29081/Management_Report_Addiction_Starts_at_the 
_Top (stating ninety percent of workers feel compulsion to use their smart phone). 
 4. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2008) (stating that the maximum hour requirements of 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206 do not apply to “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or 
professional capacity . . . or in the capacity of outside salesman”). 
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There are currently no lawsuits alleging violations of the FLSA’s 
overtime provisions with respect to the use of smart phones outside of 
work, but experts believe it is only a matter of time before a claim is 
filed.5  Companies have begun to institute new policies and procedures 
attempting to preempt any potential issues with employees.6  The best 
policy would be to never give smart phones to non-exempt employees, 
but this is not always feasible.7  Employees may purchase their own 
smart phone and use it to increase their productivity.8  As a result, smart 
phone-related policies can only partially insulate companies from 
liability because employees may be working unrequested overtime that is 
compensable if the employer has knowledge of the work.9 
In 2007, the U.S. Department of Labor collected $163 million in 
back wages for overtime violations.10  Companies also face fines for 
violations of the FLSA, which totaled $3.9 million in 2007.11  Given the 
continued growth of the smart-phone market, companies face the 
potential for huge verdicts or settlements and protracted litigation over 
wage-and-hour claims for smart-phone use.  In fact, under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 216(b), successful FLSA claimants can “recover unpaid regular and 
overtime wages, an additional amount of liquidated damages equaling 
the amount of the wages recovered, legal or equitable relief, costs, and 
mandatory attorneys’ fees.”12  Without settled policies and procedures 
defining how to calculate overtime when using a smart phone, employers 
are exposing themselves to unexpected liabilities.  Courts have yet to 
develop any precedent regarding the fair and proper method to calculate 
compensable time for smart-phone use.  This creates a situation that is 
unfair to both the employer and employee.  Employees could potentially 
claim overtime each time they check their e-mail while at home.  
                                                     
 5. Joseph Pisani, Workplace BlackBerry Use May Spur Lawsuits, CNBC.COM, July 9, 2008, 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/25586129 (“‘I’ll bet anything that a lawsuit is going [to] happen,’ says 
Robert Brady, founder and CEO of Business & Legal Reports, a company that works with human 
resource professionals to comply with the law.”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Cheng, supra note 2 (stating that “[a]bout 80% of workplace smartphones used at small 
businesses were purchased by employees”). 
 9. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 337–51 (3d ed. 2005) (“Work not 
required or requested by the employer counts as hours worked if the employer has actual or 
constructive knowledge of it.”). 
 10. How to Audit Your Payroll Department for DOL Compliance, 2008 PAYROLL MANAGER’S 
REP. 1 [hereinafter DOL Compliance]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Scott Edward Cole & Matthew R. Bainer, To Certify or Not To Certify: A Circuit-By-
Circuit Primer on the Varying Standards for Class Certification in Actions Under the Federal Labor 
Standards Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167, 168 (2004). 
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Employees can easily take advantage of poor policies, and companies 
will feel the financial repercussions.  For example, a woman in Chicago 
was able to record 800 hours of overtime in seventeen weeks, which 
entitled her to a $32,000 payout.13  Alternatively, employers could refuse 
to compensate employees for smart-phone use because the employer 
believes the work is not compensable. 
This Comment examines the plain meaning of the elements in the 
FLSA that apply to compensating non-exempt employees for overtime.  
It also examines judicial interpretations of the FLSA and congressional 
amendments to the FLSA, both of which affect the FLSA’s scope and 
application.  This Comment argues that the United States Supreme Court 
has established a broad definition of “work,” under which non-exempt 
employee smart-phone use could certainly qualify.  Under the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation, there is a strong potential that employers will be 
liable for smart-phone overtime claims.  This Comment discusses the 
judicial interpretations and congressional amendments to provide an 
analytical framework for examining the legitimacy of potential wage-
and-hour claims.  Additionally, this Comment examines how the 
framework can be used to control employer liability in frivolous and 
unreasonable smart-phone overtime claims and ultimately provides 
advice on policies and procedures that may limit employer liability. 
Section II of this Comment will give a detailed overview and 
background of the FLSA and the policies behind its enactment.  The 
section will provide specific insight on how the Supreme Court interprets 
the meaning of “work” within the FLSA.  Additionally, it will note how 
the courts and Congress have attempted to balance the FLSA’s broad aim 
of protecting workers against the practical realities of industry with an 
eye toward protecting employers from unforeseen liability.  The three 
limitations analyzed will be the de minimis doctrine, the Portal-to-Portal 
Act of 1947,14 and the case law regarding on-call duty.  Section II will 
also look at the consequences employers face for violating the FLSA, 
including the Act’s mandated penalties as well as the payment to 
employees for uncompensated overtime work.  Finally, the current status 
of legal issues regarding potential smart-phone claims will be discussed. 
Section III of this Comment will provide an analysis of an 
employee’s smart-phone use in the context of the FLSA and judicial 
rulings.  First, the section will attempt to determine whether or not smart-
                                                     
 13. Lisa Belkin, O.T. Isn’t as Simple as Telling Time, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at G2. 
 14. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262 (2006); see Marc Linder, Class 
Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 55 
(1991). 
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phone use constitutes work under the FLSA’s definition of overtime and 
under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad v. 
Muscoda Local No. 123.15  Second, the section will use judicial and 
congressional limitations to analyze smart-phone use.  Particularly, the 
analysis will look at the strengths and weaknesses of the three exceptions 
as applied to potential smart-phone claims.  The section will attempt to 
develop a framework which courts can use to examine smart-phone 
claims.  Finally, the section will provide employers with potential 
solutions for limiting and controlling the non-exempt employee’s use of 
a smart phone while off-duty. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In evaluating wage-and-hour claims, it is important to understand the 
statutes that state the law and the cases that interpret the appropriate 
application.  The FLSA is the primary statute used in overtime claims.16  
The Supreme Court and courts across the country have interpreted the 
Act and applied it to many different fact patterns.17  This section provides 
both the statutory and common-law background for wage-and-hour 
claims. 
A. Overview of the FLSA 
The FLSA was enacted to establish a uniform system of law that 
guaranteed compensation for work done to all employees covered under 
the Act.18  In the declaration of policy, Congress recognized that “the 
existence . . . of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the 
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general 
well-being of workers” was negatively affecting commerce.19  Two of 
the most notable provisions of the FLSA are the minimum-wage 
requirement and the establishment of overtime.20  Prior to the enactment 
of the FLSA, companies often used collective bargaining agreements and 
custom to establish the standard for compensation, but the FLSA set a 
                                                     
 15. 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944), superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 
Stat. 84 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262). 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 17. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1, II.C.1, II.C.3. 
 18. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R., 321 U.S. at 602. 
 19. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). 
 20. See id. §§ 206–207. 
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standardized guide for employers to follow.21  The Great Depression was 
the primary motivator behind the FLSA, and the minimum-wage and 
overtime provisions were designed to provide incentives for employers 
to offer more jobs while making sure workers were not abused.22  
Following its policy declaration, Congress established broad definitions 
and laws designed to protect workers “without substantially curtailing 
employment or earning power.”23 
B. FLSA Requirements for Overtime 
The overtime provisions of the FLSA are set forth in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 207(a).24  Section 207 is entitled “Maximum Hours” and sets forth the 
applicable guideline: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ 
any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or 
in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an 
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such 
employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the 
hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the 
regular rate at which he is employed.25 
Within this provision there are several terms which are defined in the 
FLSA,26 but those terms that are not defined have been subject to 
considerable debate and litigation.27  An employer is defined as “any 
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee . . . .”28  The definition of employer is interpreted 
very broadly in order to “carry out the declared purpose of the Act.”29  
An employee is defined as an “individual employed by an employer,”30 
                                                     
 21. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R., 321 U.S. at 600–02 (noting that the FLSA makes any prior 
custom or contract immaterial if the customary compensation standards fall below those set forth in 
the Act). 
 22. David Phelps, Surge in Wage Suits has Courts on Overtime, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, 
Minn.), Oct. 7, 2007, at 1D. 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b). 
 24. Id. § 207(a). 
 25. Id. § 207(a)(1). 
 26. Id. § 203. 
 27. See, e.g., Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 800–01 (6th Cir. 2001) (analyzing 
compensable “work” under the FLSA). 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 
 29. Walling v. Atl. Greyhound Corp., 61 F. Supp. 992, 993 (E.D.S.C. 1945) (noting the “term 
‘employer’ is not limited to the narrow conception of principal and agent, or master and servant”). 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
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and employ means “to suffer or permit to work.”31  The courts limited 
the broadness of these definitions by declaring that the purpose of the 
FLSA is to apply fixed standards for existing wage liabilities but not to 
create new wage liabilities.32 
The FLSA also exempts certain workers from the maximum-hour 
requirements.33  Specifically, the FLSA states that employees working in 
executive, administrative, professional, or outside sales positions will be 
excluded from the maximum-hours requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 207.34  
These terms are “defined and delimited” by the Department of Labor 
(DOL).35  In 2004, the DOL added another qualification to the exemption 
requiring that employees be paid a salary basis of at least $455 per week 
in addition to the job capacity requirements.36  Employers do not have to 
meet the FLSA minimum-wage and maximum-hour requirements for 
employees who fall under the exemptions.  The Supreme Court, 
emphasizing the purpose of the FLSA, has stated that the exemptions 
should be narrowly construed in order give plain meaning to the statute 
and the intent of Congress.37  Thus the burden is on the employer to 
prove a particular employee falls within a certain exemption.38  Any 
investigation of exempt status involves an in-depth look at the facts as 
they apply to the employment standards set forth by the DOL.39 
1. What Constitutes Work Under the FLSA? 
In order to determine how much overtime an employee is entitled to, 
the court must determine what constitutes compensable work.  The 
FLSA provides no specific definition of work.40  In addressing this basic 
question, the Supreme Court determined work should be understood as it 
is commonly used.41  In Tennessee Coal, the Supreme Court stated that 
work meant “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) 
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and 
                                                     
 31. Id. § 203(g). 
 32. E.g., Bowman v. Pace Co., 119 F.2d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1941). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 213. 
 34. Id. § 213(a)(1). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 29 C.F.R. § 541.600(a) (2005). 
 37. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945). 
 38. Idaho Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 209 (1966). 
 39. Cooke v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 993 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D. Conn. 1997). 
 40. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 337 (stating the FLSA “does not contain any 
general definition of ‘work’ or of compensable time”). 
 41. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). 
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primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.”42  The 
Supreme Court took this definition primarily from the unabridged second 
edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary.43  In Steiner v. 
Mitchell, the Court expanded the definition to include compensation for 
work that was performed while the employee was off-duty as long as the 
work was “an integral and indispensable part of the [employee’s] 
principal activities.”44 
Additionally, compensation cannot be denied only because the 
employee could have accomplished and finished the work during the 
scheduled time.45  In Brock v. City of Cincinnati, the court looked at 
three issues to determine the nature of the work: (1) Did the employer 
“require or suffer” the employees to perform the duties? (2) How much 
of the off-duty work was performed “necessarily and primarily for the 
benefit” of the employer? and (3) Was the off-duty work an “integral and 
indispensable part of the principal activities” for which the employee was 
hired?46  Ultimately, courts will look at the totality of circumstances to 
determine if the work the employee performed was compensable.47  
Using the totality of circumstances and the general definition of work, 
the courts have found the FLSA covers such work activities “as watching 
and guarding a building, waiting for work, and standing by on call.”48 
C. Ways in Which Congress and the Judicial System Sought to Limit the 
Supreme Court’s Broad Interpretation of “Work” 
The definition of “work” set forth in Tennessee Coal was broad to 
the point that new liabilities would be created.49  It was not beneficial to 
either the courts or employers to have such a broad definition.  The 
courts would be clogged with frivolous claims, and the employers would 
face increased legal fees having to defend claims from any employee 
who felt he or she was not fairly compensated.  The courts developed the 
de minimis doctrine to meet the practical administrative concerns of 
                                                     
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 598 n.11. 
 44. 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). 
 45. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, NY, 145 F.3d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 46. 236 F.3d 793, 801 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 47. Holzapfel, 145 F.3d at 524; see also ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 337–41 (stating 
that determining compensability for physical or mental exertion requires looking at a variety of 
factors and resolution of the issue depends on the facts of the case). 
 48. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R., 321 U.S. at 599 (citations omitted). 
 49. See generally Steiner, 350 U.S. at 254 (noting that “the Senate intended the activities of 
changing clothes and showering to be . . . [considered “work”] if they are an integral part of and are 
essential to the principal activities of the employees”). 
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compensating an employee for only a few seconds or minutes of work.50  
Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act to limit compensable work 
done before and after work to only those activities which are integral and 
indispensable to the employee’s principal activity.51  Furthermore, the 
courts have heard several cases addressing the circumstances and factors 
in which on-call duty may be compensable. 
1. The De Minimis Doctrine 
Concerned with the possibility of producing new liabilities with the 
broad definition of work, the Supreme Court recognized the potential 
application of a de minimis doctrine.52  The doctrine was aimed at 
allowing courts to treat negligible amounts of work as non-compensable 
even though they were theoretically compensable under the FLSA.53  The 
doctrine is primarily concerned with taking a practical approach to the 
administrative difficulties of recording small amounts of time.54  The 
Court recognized that the FLSA’s definition of work must be computed 
“‘in light of the realities of the industrial world.’”55  Particular focus was 
put on the work being substantial as opposed to an employee claiming 
overtime for a “few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled 
working hours.”56  In fact, the Supreme Court stated that the FLSA does 
not preclude the use of reasonable provisions of contract or custom to 
keep track of compensable time when there is no particularly accurate 
system in place.57  Thus, the courts did not establish a bright-line rule but 
rather relied on looking at the facts in light of “common sense.”58 
The Lindow v. United States court laid out three considerations when 
making de minimis determinations: “(1) the practical administrative 
difficulty of recording the additional time; (2) the aggregate amount of 
compensable time; and (3) the regularity of the additional work.”59  The 
practical administrative consideration takes into account the “‘realities of 
                                                     
 50. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.47 (“In recording work time under the Act, insubstantial or 
insignificant periods of time beyond the scheduled working hours, which cannot as a practical 
administrative matter be precisely recorded for payroll purposes, may be disregarded.  The courts 
have held that such trifles are de minimis.”). 
 51. Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256. 
 52. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946). 
 53. Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 804 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 54. Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 55. Id. at 1063 (quoting Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692). 
 56. Id. at 1062 (quoting Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692). 
 57. Brock, 236 F.3d at 801. 
 58. Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1062. 
 59. Id. at 1063. 
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the industrial world.’”60  Courts have found that claims that may be de 
minimis on a daily basis can be aggregated into a “substantial claim” and 
thus eligible for compensation under the FLSA.61  The court reasoned 
that it would be unfair to compensate a worker $50 for a week’s work but 
deny the same compensation to another worker who earned $1 a week 
for fifty weeks.62  Finally, when looking at the regularity of the 
additional work, courts have found sporadic work and isolated instances 
are not enough to defeat the de minimis doctrine.63  Despite the absence 
of a bright-line rule, most courts have found that in most cases anything 
less than ten minutes is de minimis.64  The de minimis doctrine has been 
fundamental in declaring preliminary work activities as falling outside of 
the scope of the FLSA.65 
2. 1947 Portal-to-Portal Act Amendment 
In response to case law which increased the exposure of companies 
to unexpected liabilities, Congress amended the FLSA in 1947 to include 
the Portal-to-Portal Act.66  The Portal-to-Portal Act specifically made the 
following activities noncompensable: 
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of 
performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee 
is employed to perform, and 
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal 
activity or activities, which occur prior to the time on any particular 
workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the 
time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal 
activity or activities.67 
In Steiner v. Mitchell, the Court found employees’ time spent showering 
and changing clothes after working with hazardous materials was an 
integral and indispensable part of the job and included in the principal 
activities.68  Thus the employee’s preliminary and postliminary work was 
                                                     
 60. Id. (quoting Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1062. 
 65. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 693 (1946). 
 66. Bobo v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 690, 692 (1997). 
 67. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (1994)). 
 68. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 251–53 (1956). 
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excluded from the provisions of the Portal-to-Portal Act.69  The Supreme 
Court held that “activities performed either before or after the regular 
work shift, on or off the production line, are compensable” even with the 
Portal-to-Portal Act’s revisions to the FLSA.70  The Court reviewed the 
legislative history and the language of the statute and reasoned that 
Congress did not intend the Portal-to-Portal Act to deprive workers of 
FLSA benefits for work that is an integral and indispensable part of their 
principal activity.71 
3. Judicial Understanding of What Constitutes On-Call Time 
Another restriction on the FLSA’s broad definition of work applies 
to employees who are deemed to be on call.  Stemming from the Armour 
& Co. v. Wantock72 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.73 cases in which the 
Supreme Court declared that waiting time may be compensable 
depending on the circumstances,74 courts have faced issues over whether 
or not on-call time is considered compensable under the FLSA.75  As 
with most overtime claims, on-call inquiries are “highly individualized 
and fact-based”76 and need to be addressed with an emphasis on 
practicality.77 
The DOL has set forth regulations concerning on-call compensation 
in 29 C.F.R. section 553.221(d).78  The regulations state that “[t]ime 
spent at home on call may or may not be compensable depending on 
whether the restrictions placed on the employee preclude using the time 
for personal pursuits.”79  The regulations further state that “where the 
conditions placed on the employee’s activities are so restrictive that the 
employee cannot use the time effectively for personal pursuits, such time 
spent on call is compensable.”80  Allowable restrictions often include not 
being able to drink alcohol or take mind-altering drugs.81  It is also 
                                                     
 69. Id. at 256. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 254–56. 
 72. 323 U.S. 126 (1944). 
 73. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 74. Armour & Co., 323 U.S. at 133; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136. 
 75. Adair v. Charter County of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482, 486–87 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 76. Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 77. Reimer v. Champion Healthcare Corp., 258 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 78. Adair, 452 F.3d at 487. 
 79. 29 C.F.R. § 553.221(d) (2009). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Reimer, 258 F.3d at 725. 
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tolerable to have a defined method of keeping in contact with the 
employee whether it is a pager, cell phone, or the employees telling their 
employer where they can be contacted during their on-call duty.82 
Section 785.17 also addresses the on-call issue by stating that an 
employee “required to remain on call on the employer’s premises or so 
close thereto that he cannot use the time effectively for his own purposes 
is working while ‘on call.’”83  On the contrary, an employee that “is not 
required to remain on the employer’s premises but is merely required to 
leave word at his home or with company officials where he may be 
reached is not working while on call.”84  Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. 
Mary’s Hospitals, Inc., stated that it is important to look at how the on-
call arrangement affected an employee’s ability to effectively use his 
time.85  An employee who is at home during his on-call duty but called 
away every other hour will not be able to effectively use his time.86  
However, as in Dinges, if there exists less than a fifty percent chance of 
being called during a fourteen to sixteen hour on-call period, then time 
may be used effectively.87  Additional factors for the courts to consider 
include excessive geographical restrictions, the ability to trade the on-call 
responsibilities, and the ability to ease restrictions.88  It is important to 
note that any of the factors by themselves are not conclusive.89 
Circuit courts remain split on workers who always keep employees 
on call.  The Fifth Circuit stated that it is extremely burdensome to 
always be on call, but that does not necessarily make the on-call time 
compensable.90  However, the Eighth Circuit has held that making 
employees monitor and respond all day, every day weighs heavily 
toward being compensable under the FLSA.91  The Tenth Circuit also 
takes the always-being-on-call burden as relevant to the inquiry but 
certainly not dispositive.92  In on-call FLSA cases, courts will typically 
review de novo the particular set of facts and look for the most factually 
                                                     
 82. See Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary’s Hosps., Inc., 164 F.3d 1056, 1057–59 (7th Cir. 
1999) (deciding that emergency medical technicians’ time spent on call is not compensable although 
they must be in position for hospital to contact them). 
 83. 29 C.F.R. § 785.17. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Dinges, 164 F.3d at 1058. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Perkins Coie, Potential Overtime Issues in an Increasingly Technological Society, 14 OR. 
EMP. L. LETTER, Aug. 2008, at 5. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Bright v. Houston Nw. Med. Ctr., Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 678–79 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 91. Cross v. Ark. Forestry Comm’n, 938 F.2d 912, 916–17 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 92. Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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analogous cases.93  This necessarily means each claim has the potential 
for endless litigation at great expense to the company. 
D. Penalties and Consequences of FLSA Violations 
In addition to the large settlements and verdicts facing employers 
who violate the overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA, 
employers can also face fines and imprisonment.94  Section 216 sets out a 
maximum fine of $10,000 and imprisonment up to six months (although 
prison sentences are reserved for repeat offenders).95  But the bigger 
penalty faced is that the FLSA states any employer who violates the 
provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207 will be liable for the unpaid wages of the 
employee or employees affected.96  As such, employers paid $163 
million in 2007.97 
E. Current Smart-Phone Legal Issues 
There are presently no cases in the U.S. courts litigating a non-
exempt employee’s FLSA wage-and-hour claim based on the employee’s 
use of his smart phone outside of his regular work hours.98  Many 
companies, on the advice of attorneys and consultants, have drawn up 
policies and procedures to preempt any attempt by an employee to claim 
overtime for simply checking his e-mail.99  But even the best laid policies 
can only prevent so much, especially when office culture is increasingly 
smart-phone oriented and employees are feeling pressure from their 
peers and superiors to stay in contact around the clock.100 
Employers should be particularly concerned about the lenient 
standard for FLSA class-action certification.101  The process for FLSA 
class certification requires the plaintiff to prove “that an adequate 
number of class members will ultimately opt into the action, and that 
these class members are likely to satisfy the ‘similarly situated’ standard 
of the relevant Federal tribunal.”102  The burden on the plaintiff is 
                                                     
 93. Id. at 1134. 
 94. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (2006). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. § 216(b). 
 97. DOL Compliance, supra note 10, at 1. 
 98. See Pisani, supra note 5 (stating that “experts . . . are not aware of any current lawsuits”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Management Report, supra note 3. 
 101. Cole & Bainer, supra note 12, at 169–70. 
 102. Id. 
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relatively “de minimis,” and the federal courts usually permit the 
issuance of notice upon the representative plaintiffs’ declaration of the 
action.103  Such a “de minimis” burden “tends to produce an even more 
robust-sized class.”104  The threat of a large class action wage-and-hour 
claim should provide an ample incentive for employers to reevaluate 
their policies and procedures for smart-phone use and overtime 
compensation. 
The drafters of the FLSA in 1938 certainly did not envision having 
to deal with the technology issues of today, but smart-phone claims will 
probably follow the same line of fact-intensive inquiry.  Until there are 
some cases addressing the issue, a careful analysis of potential smart-
phone claims must be done to determine where the claims may fit in 
terms of FLSA’s understanding of “work” and the limitations on the 
definition. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court and the FLSA have developed definitions of 
“work,” and it is important to first address how smart-phone use fits into 
this definition.  This section will first determine whether the use of a 
smart phone constitutes work under the FLSA.  All inquiries into 
overtime compensation must begin by analyzing whether or not the work 
qualifies as compensable.  It is only after determining if the work is 
compensable that the judicial and congressional limitations can be 
applied.  This section only contemplates non-exempt employee smart-
phone use because, under the FLSA, non-exempt employees are the only 
employees eligible to receive overtime compensation. 
A. Does the Use of a Smart Phone Facially Constitute Work Under the 
FLSA? 
Determining the legitimacy of an overtime claim under the FLSA 
will depend on whether the employee’s use of a smart phone fits into the 
Act’s broad definition of “work.”  The FLSA does not explicitly define 
“work,” but the Supreme Court has broadly defined it as “physical or 
mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by 
the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the 
                                                     
 103. Id. at 170. 
 104. Id. 
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employer and his business.”105  Taking the definition element by element, 
the use of a smart phone probably fits into the definition. 
1. Whether Smart-Phone Use Constitutes “Physical or Mental” 
Exertion 
First, the use of a smart phone consists of “physical or mental 
exertion” to some extent.  The main tool of a smart phone is the ability to 
send and receive e-mail, and writing an e-mail for work requires some 
sort of mental exertion.  Additionally, smart phones are now becoming 
advanced to the point that documents such as contracts, presentations, 
and articles can be viewed using such phones.106  These activities would 
fit into “mental exertion” if the documents needed to be approved or 
edited before being sent to clients.  Furthermore, the definition is 
qualified by the fact that the exertion does not need to be burdensome.107  
This additional qualification makes the already liberal compensable-time 
test even more so.108  Under the test, responding to e-mail, answering 
work calls, doing Internet research, or any other employment activity 
performed using the smart phone fit into the FLSA’s definition of 
“work” because the employee is producing for the employer.109  The no-
burden qualification could even make typing, scrolling, and dialing on 
the phone a compensable physical exertion. 
2. Determining Whether the Employer Controls or Requires the 
Employee’s Use of a Smart Phone Outside the Office 
The second part, “controlled or required by the employer,” involves 
a look at the policies and procedures of the company.  An employer 
cannot deny compensation to an employee if the employer “knows or has 
reason to know that an employee is working overtime . . . even where the 
employee fails to claim overtime hours.”110  Constructive knowledge is 
                                                     
 105. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). 
 106. Apple Introduces the iPhone 3G, MACWORLD, Aug. 1, 2008, at 20 (“During his keynote, 
[Steve] Jobs said that the new software will have a search feature for contacts, full support for iWork 
documents, the ability to view PowerPoint presentations, and a scientific calculator that appears 
when you launch the Calculator application and rotate the iPhone into landscape mode.”). 
 107. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 337. 
 108. See id. (“In an early trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court mandated liberal tests for 
determining compensable time.”). 
 109. Id. at 338 (stating that under the Supreme Court tests, any time “spent in production and 
related activities is clearly compensable”). 
 110. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, NY, 145 F.3d 516, 524 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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all that is required for the employer to be liable.111  This is particularly 
important in the smart-phone office culture, where most workers feel 
some sort of compulsion to use their smart phones outside of work.112  
Furthermore, companies often appreciate an employee’s willingness to 
be available outside of work.113  A company would have a hard time 
denying knowledge of overtime activities if it provided smart phones to 
non-exempt workers.  The Tenth Circuit has found constructive 
knowledge when an employer creates an on-call system for employees.114  
Providing a smart phone to non-exempt workers with the expectation that 
they will use it for work would be similar to creating an on-call system.  
Although not inevitable, there would certainly be an expectation that the 
smart phone will eventually be used outside of work.  If there is no 
explicit policy telling non-exempt workers to leave their phones at work 
or to never use it outside of the office, employees may feel as if they are 
“required” to use the smart phone to constantly stay in touch with the 
office. 
The “required” element could also be imputed if senior employees 
consistently send e-mails and documents after hours with the expectation 
that non-exempt workers will check their smart phones during the 
evening or weekend.  The Second Circuit found this to be a reasonable 
conclusion and stated “[e]ven if the work was not ‘reasonably required,’ 
nonetheless the employee may be compelled or pressured by the 
employer to do it, and if so, should be compensated for doing it.”115 
Employers may also have sufficient actual knowledge to make it 
appear as if they acquiesced to the uncompensated overtime.  The 
Eleventh Circuit held that an employer had actual knowledge when it 
received weekly reports showing employees worked more hours than 
they reported because the employer prohibited overtime.116  Companies 
can set up systems to monitor smart-phone use and at the very least 
managers can monitor the times when e-mails were sent, documents 
were sent, or calls were made.117  It would be hard for an employer to 
                                                     
 111. Id. 
 112. Management Report, supra note 3. 
 113. Jeffrey M. Schlossberg & Kimberely B. Malerba, Are Employees Who Check Devices Off 
Hours Entitled to Overtime Pay?, N.Y. L.J., May 21, 2007. 
 114. Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 115. Holzapfel, 145 F.3d at 524. 
 116. Reich v. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 28 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 117. Russell A. Ventura & Caroline A. Flotron, Telecommuting, in 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW 
UPDATE 53, 67 (Henry H. Perritt, Jr. ed., 2001) (“It may be easy for an employer to keep track of an 
employee’s hours through computer-generated time reports that enumerate hours and log-on 
times.”). 
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deny actual knowledge when the e-mails or phone calls were clearly 
made outside of office hours.  An employer’s best option to avoid 
liability is forbidding any unauthorized overtime work and establishing a 
compliance system.118  A complete prohibition of smart-phone use may 
not be practical, but the employer could require that employees make 
daily reports of their smart-phone use and get approval for working 
outside of the office.119  Without policies and procedures in place, 
companies risk courts looking at the totality of circumstances to 
determine if employees felt required to use their smart phones outside of 
work. 
3. Determining if the Employee’s Use of a Smart Phone Is Done 
“Necessarily and Primarily” for the Employer’s Benefit 
The final part, “pursued necessarily and primarily for the employer 
and the benefit of his business,” requires an inquiry into whether the 
employer received any benefit from the work and if it was necessary for 
the employee to perform the labor outside of the regular working 
hours.120  The Supreme Court held traveling down a mine shaft in order 
to reach the working areas is necessary to production.121  The Court 
reasoned that the employer’s benefit from production was entirely 
dependent upon the miners getting to the work areas, and it does not 
matter that the travel time was not in and of itself productive because 
nothing in the FLSA “demands that every moment of an employee’s time 
devoted to the service of his employer shall be directly productive.”122  
Thus the benefit to the employer does not need to be the actual 
production of goods or services.  This understanding of the phrase, 
however, seems overly broad because the line of reasoning could be 
drawn out to almost anything a worker does that is semi-related to work.  
Theoretically, waking up, eating, putting on clothes, and driving to work 
(which the Portal-to-Portal Act addressed and limited123) could qualify as 
benefitting the employer’s business.  As applied to smart-phone use, it 
could be argued that the employee is ultimately benefitting the employer 
by simply keeping the phone on his person while away from the office. 
                                                     
 118. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 338 (“Employers who wish to avoid liability for these 
hours should forbid unauthorized work beyond the normal working day and establish a system to 
police compliance with the rule.”). 
 119. Ventura & Flotron, supra note 117, at 67. 
 120. See infra Part III.A. 
 121. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 599 (1944). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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The Second Circuit provides helpful guidance for jury instruction in 
Holzapfel: 
If the employee was motivated primarily by his or her own pleasure, 
then the time was not expended primarily for the employer’s benefit 
and it is not compensable; similarly, if the time was expended primarily 
to inflate the employee’s earnings, then the time was not primarily for 
the employer’s benefit and is not compensable.124 
Both prongs of the jury instruction help to eliminate the employee using 
their employer-issued smart phone to take advantage of the FLSA 
overtime rules.  The first prong of the test eliminates an employee using 
the smart phone for any non-work related functions and claiming 
overtime merely because the employer issued them the phone.  The 
second prong is also helpful in eliminating an employee doing frivolous 
tasks in order to incur overtime, although the effectiveness of the 
instructions is highly dependent upon how the jury views the facts.  
There is a great potential for abuse with smart phones, especially when 
employees could spend countless hours scrolling through e-mails or even 
waiting to write e-mails after hours in order to accumulate overtime. 
The Ninth Circuit addressed a similar issue to this and initially noted 
that there is “no authority . . . which suggests that an employee’s labor is 
not integral and indispensable if it could have been performed during 
regular hours.”125  The court, however, affirmed the district court’s ruling 
that preliminary activities were not necessary or integral because the 
activities did not need to be performed before the start of the employee’s 
shift.126  The court based its ruling on two factors: (1) the employees 
could have performed the work during regular hours and (2) the 
company had issued a letter that told employees they were not required 
to report early.127  This ruling has two consequences for smart-phone 
claims. 
First, it will play an important role in analyzing an employee’s 
smart-phone use.  Courts will have to look at the employee’s use with an 
eye toward whether the work the employee did had to be done outside of 
the office or whether the employee could have waited to perform the 
work on the next day in the office.  This is a highly factual inquiry but 
important because an employee could potentially abuse the overtime by 
replying to e-mails or reviewing documents after hours even though the 
                                                     
 124. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, NY, 145 F.3d 516, 523 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 125. Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 126. Id. at 1060. 
 127. Id. at 1060–61. 
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employer’s expectation was to have the work done while the employee 
was on duty.  However, any inquiry into this issue will have to take into 
account the office culture to determine if employees were actually 
abusing the smart phone or simply striving to meet their employer’s 
expectation for off-duty work.  An employee may technically be able to 
perform the duties the next day, but it may negatively impact the 
employee with regards to how a manager views the employee’s 
performance. 
Second, it makes clear how important it is for a company to enact 
policies regarding the use of smart phones.  As the court noted, the 
policies will play a factor in determining the compensability of the work.  
An established smart-phone policy may help an employer avoid 
liability.128  The policies also help inform employees of expectations for 
work done while off-duty.129  Employees with smart phones need to 
know if they are expected to respond to e-mails when they are off-duty.  
Furthermore, exempt employees should be informed of the consequences 
of encouraging off-duty responses from non-exempt employees. 
There remains a potential argument from the on-call line of cases 
that could affect a court’s analysis.  The “necessarily and primarily” 
standard requires work to be pursued for the benefit of the employer, but 
courts fail to fully examine what constitutes benefit to the employer.130  
A court can easily recognize that an employee using a smart phone after 
hours can provide productive and tangible benefits in reading and 
answering e-mails.  In on-call cases, however, it is also suggested that 
the cost efficiency of allowing workers to go home be analyzed against 
the cost of regular time at work.131  Employers realize a significant cost 
benefit by allowing employees to be on-call rather than requiring them to 
stay at work or increasing employment to make sure the employer’s 
services are always available.132  Analyzing employer benefit in this 
manner can lead to the conclusion that the “use of beepers and cell-
phones [to keep] employers increasingly in touch with their 
                                                     
 128. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF BUS. LAW, EMPLOYEE USE OF THE INTERNET AND E-MAIL: A 
MODEL CORPORATE POLICY 1 (David M. Doubilet & Vincent I. Polley eds., 2002) (“By articulating 
permitted and prohibited activities, a company may be able to establish its ‘good faith,’ and 
demonstrate that certain employee activities were outside the course and scope of employ (thereby 
avoiding imputed liability for the employees’ actions).”) [hereinafter MODEL CORPORATE POLICY]. 
 129. Id. (stating an electronic communication policy can help protect the company and educate 
employees). 
 130. Gretchen Fuss, Refining the Tenth Circuit’s Stance on Employee Rights: The ADA, Free 
Speech in the Workplace, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 433, 455 (2002). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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employees . . . may sometimes require compensation.”133  The idea 
acknowledges the inherent benefit to the employer in the on-call 
arrangement and recognizes that any work done while on-call is 
compensable.134 
Even though the cost-benefit analysis comes from the on-call line of 
cases, there is overlap.  An employer-issued smart phone, with no 
company directive not to use the smart phone while off-duty, is similar to 
a beeper or cell phone issued for on-call duty.  Therefore, the same cost-
benefit analysis is potentially present with smart-phone use.  An 
employee could spend thirty minutes of compensable time answering e-
mails that came in after regular work hours, or the employee could spend 
three hours in the office waiting for the e-mails and be compensated for 
three hours.  There is the same inherent benefit for the employer with 
smart-phone use as there is in on-call employment.  Allowing 
compensation for beeper or cell-phone use seems to make legitimate 
smart-phone use presumptively compensable.  This only further 
highlights the need for employers to adopt policies and procedures that 
deal with smart-phone use. 
4. Potential Court Outcome 
As the Supreme Court stated, “whether time is spent predominantly 
for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a question dependent 
upon all the circumstances of the case.”135  But using a smart phone can 
easily fit into the broad definition of “work” under the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation in Tennessee Coal.136  The requirement that an employee’s 
exertion does not need to be burdensome easily includes responding to e-
mails, reviewing documents, or doing Internet research for the company.  
A potential claim that includes the above-listed duties would certainly fit 
into the Court’s definition of “work” because the Court did not set a 
threshold level of exertion and such duties all involve some level of 
mental exertion. 
Whether the work must be required by the employer is not quite as 
clear, but the courts are allowed to look beyond explicit directions from 
                                                     
 133. Id. 
 134. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 338–39 (“Constraints on an employee’s freedom 
are, however, inherent in the concept of being on call and do not by themselves render on-call time 
compensable.”). 
 135. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944). 
 136. 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). 
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employers to determine if employees feel compelled to work.137  The best 
evidence that employees are required to use their smart phones while off-
duty is specific employer policies noting the requirements.  Employers 
that issue smart phones, however, may want to reexamine their e-mail 
policies, as they could now be viewed as encouraging frequent e-mail 
checking.138  In the absence of official policies, the office culture and the 
behavior of senior employees may establish a culture where employees 
feel compelled to use their phones.  Courts will likely find employees felt 
required to use the smart phone while off-duty in offices where the 
company issues smart phones to non-exempt employees, senior 
employees frequently send e-mails to non-exempt employees after office 
hours, and the company encourages and rewards non-exempt employees 
who go beyond the requirements of their job descriptions. 
Finally, when determining if the work was pursued necessarily for 
the benefit of the employer, the courts will look at the nature of the work 
and any company policies addressing the issue of overtime.  Company 
policies specifically stating certain work does not qualify as overtime or 
overtime is not allowed in certain instances are the best evidence that the 
employee’s work was not necessary.  The inquiry into the nature of the 
work requires looking at why the employee was performing the work.  
For overtime claims based on smart phones, this may be the hardest 
aspect to prove because the employee will have to prove the off-duty use 
of the phone was necessary and benefitted the employer.  Additionally, 
an employee will have to definitively show that he was not taking 
advantage of the employer to accumulate overtime hours and that the 
work claimed was not done for pleasure.  Courts will likely find the 
smart-phone use was necessary for the benefit of the employer if the 
employee shows the work performed was an integral and indispensable 
part of the job, there were no company policies explicitly disallowing 
overtime, and the employee shows there was no abuse of the system. 
Given the right set of facts, an employee bringing an overtime claim 
under the FLSA based on his off-duty use of a smart phone could 
certainly be successful under the Supreme Court’s broad definition of 
                                                     
 137. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, NY, 145 F.3d 516, 524 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 138. See MODEL CORPORATE POLICY, supra note 128, at xxv.  The suggested model for 
corporate e-mail policy states: 
Reading your e-mail is a professional responsibility, just like answering your telephone.  
As a general rule, you should check your e-mail at least twice a day when you’re not 
traveling.  When on the road, e-mail should be checked as often as possible or you can 
enable a colleague to check it for you. 
As a model this may be appropriate for computer-based e-mail but also could have undesirable 
implications on checking e-mail with smart phones. 
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“work.”  Courts have often followed this broad definition and 
consistently found off-duty work is compensable in certain cases, and the 
subsequent litigation usually involves determining reasonable 
compensation for the work.139  However, Congress has enacted 
amendments and the courts have created judicial exceptions that could 
negate many of the claims. 
B. Congressional Amendments and Judicial Rulings Limiting the 
Supreme Court’s Broad Definition of “Work” 
Congress and the courts have attempted to limit the applications of 
the broad definition of “work” set forth in Tennessee Coal.140  The courts 
have worked to eliminate unexpected liabilities for trivial matters with 
the de minimis doctrine, which addresses small amounts of time that are 
hard to accurately compute or work that is so miniscule it may not 
qualify as work.141  Concerned with the broadness of the Supreme 
Court’s definition of “work” creating “unexpected liabilities,” Congress 
enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act.142  Additionally, the courts have decided 
several cases addressing whether or not to compensate for on-call duty, 
and the facts of these cases will be analogous to any claims based on 
smart-phone use.143  The next section of this Comment will attempt to 
determine how courts will analyze an employee’s use of a smart phone 
under the applicable exceptions and case law. 
1. The De Minimis Doctrine’s Impact on Smart-Phone Claims 
The de minimis doctrine was first mentioned in Anderson v. Mt. 
Clemens Pottery Co. to address the industrial realities of computing 
time.144  The doctrine was not applied in the case but its use was 
foreshadowed in future claims where “‘precisely accurate computation is 
difficult or impossible.’”145  Industrial realities and accurate overtime 
                                                     
 139. See Paul A. Campo, Law Enforcement Issues and the FLSA, 56 J. MO. B. 336, 339–40 
(2000) (addressing canine officer cases where courts have found the off-duty work compensable). 
 140. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 141. Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 801 (6th Cir. 2001); see supra Part II.C.1. 
 142. Bobo v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 690, 692 (1997); see supra Part II.C.2. 
 143. See Adair v. Charter County of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2006); Reimer v. Champion 
Healthcare Corp., 258 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2001); Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary’s Hosps., Inc., 164 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1999); see supra 
Part II.C.3. 
 144. 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946). 
 145. Brock, 236 F.3d at 801 (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 
U.S. 590, 603 (1944)). 
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calculation are particularly relevant to the smart-phone inquiry.  The 
industrial realities test focuses on the fact that smart-phone use can 
constitute a quick glance at an e-mail or a quick reply to tell a co-worker 
you will be at a meeting.  These examples of work would probably take 
far less time to complete than the ten minute standard usually applied as 
a threshold for the de minimis doctrine.146  Second, the smart-phone use 
is often done away from the office, and there is no accurate way to 
precisely measure how long an employee was working on the phone.  
Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze potential smart-phone claims under 
the de minimis doctrine.  The Lindow court developed a three-factor test 
for applying the de minimis doctrine.147 
a. The First Factor of the Lindow Test 
The Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., stated: 
“When the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of 
work beyond the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be 
disregarded.”148  The Ninth Circuit, in Lindow, addressed this concern, 
and the first factor requires consideration of “the practical administrative 
difficulty of recording the additional time.”149  The court pointed to the 
difficulty of monitoring work that was done pre- and post-shift but on the 
employer’s premises.150  This concern would be magnified in a smart-
phone claim because the work would most likely take place away from 
the employer’s premises.  Without a program or system to monitor the 
employee’s smart-phone use, the employer would be entirely reliant on 
employee self-reporting, which could be easily abused.151 
Lindow was specifically concerned with an employee being present 
at work but not engaging in compensable work, such as conversing with 
other employees.152  Similarly, in a smart-phone claim, employers will be 
concerned that an employee’s overtime claim involved an intertwining of 
compensable work and personal smart-phone use.  The rise in the use of 
electronic means of communication at work has raised similar concerns 
regarding the use of company computers and Internet for personal e-
                                                     
 146. Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 147. Id. at 1063. 
 148. Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692. 
 149. Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1063. 
 150. Id. at 1064. 
 151. See Ventura & Flotron, supra note 117, at 73 (stating that the lack of an established policy 
to track a telecommuter’s overtime hours could lead to abuse). 
 152. Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1063–64. 
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mail.153  Employers may determine that it is in their best interest to allow 
some personal use of e-mail in fairness to the employee because the 
employee is now expected to work beyond the traditional working 
hours.154  It is, however, suggested that this approach may not translate 
for cell phones.155  This only serves to emphasize the importance of 
policies specifically addressing smart-phone use. 
Despite the potential for abuse, under the Supreme Court’s broad 
definition of work, it is likely that an employee’s smart-phone use will be 
deemed compensable, exposing an employer to lengthy and costly 
litigation in order to determine the amount of compensation owed to the 
employee.  It is therefore important to analyze the application of the de 
minimis doctrine to smart-phone claims. 
Although Anderson was written over sixty years ago, briefly 
checking e-mail for a few seconds or minutes seems to be exactly the 
type of “trifle” that would create an administrative difficulty for an 
employer.156  The initial burden lies with the employee to prove that the 
time spent engaged in preliminary or postliminary work is not de 
minimis.157  Furthermore, in the absence of official records, the employee 
must provide sufficient evidence detailing the amount of work.158  At this 
point the burden shifts to the employer to negate any inference that can 
be drawn from the employee’s evidence.159  In the best case scenario, 
both the employee and employer would keep track of smart-phone use.  
Ideally an employer could keep track of an employee’s hours using 
computer reports,160 and the employee could supplement this information 
with daily reports on hours worked.161  In this scenario, the employer 
would have an accurate reporting of overtime and be able to control the 
employee’s smart-phone use before it became too expensive. 
                                                     
 153. See MODEL CORPORATE POLICY, supra note 128, at 3 (arguing that the complete 
prohibition of personal e-mail is hard to enforce and often ignored by employees). 
 154. See id. (stating that as more employees work at non-traditional times, “it may be fair to 
permit employees to take care of some ‘personal business’ during ‘company time’”). 
 155. See id. at 4 (stating that personal e-mail policies may not be applicable with respect to the 
use of cell phones). 
 156. See Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1064 (holding that time spent checking a log book is de minimis 
and not recoverable). 
 157. LAURIE E. LEADER, WAGES & HOURS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.02(2)(c) (2009) 
[hereinafter WAGES & HOURS]. 
 158. Id. § 6.02(2)(d). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Ventura & Flotron, supra note 117, at 67 (“It may be easy for an employer to keep track of 
an employee’s hours through computer-generated time reports that enumerate hours and log-on 
times.”). 
 161. Id. (stating that nonexempt employees should be required to report the hours worked on a 
daily basis and get approval for any work “beyond a certain number of hours”). 
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Even in the absence of accurate timekeeping, the employer is still 
required “to exercise its control and ensure compliance with labor 
laws.”162  Without an accurate timekeeping system, potential evidence of 
compensable smart-phone use is difficult to quantify.  In order to prove 
hours worked, an employee may produce records of e-mails sent using a 
smart phone, making sure to note the time they were sent and the 
frequency with which it was done while off-duty.  Problematically, e-
mails typically only show the time sent or received but not how much 
time went into creating the e-mail.  Potentially, the length of the e-mail 
could be examined to estimate how long the employee spent writing the 
e-mail.  Additional evidence might include bills showing the amount of 
data sent and received and total phone-call time.  Even after looking at 
all this evidence, there would most likely be an inaccurate picture of 
actual time worked.  The result in this situation would probably not 
satisfy either the employer or the employee. 
A potential problem with the de minimis doctrine’s application to 
potential smart-phone claims is its emphasis on time rather than the 
substance of the work performed.  Generally, the de minimis doctrine 
was designed to prevent employers from having to compensate for 
insubstantial amounts of time.163  The de minimis standard is generally 
set at ten minutes, with some courts holding fifteen minutes is not 
enough to overcome the de minimis doctrine and warrant 
compensation.164  However, significant and substantive smart-phone 
work can be done in less than ten to fifteen minutes.  One could argue 
that the Supreme Court of the 1940s would not think many of the tasks 
performed on a smart phone were trifles compared to the type of work 
the de minimis doctrine was meant to address.  Smart phones are 
designed to enhance an employee’s productivity, but an employee should 
not be penalized because the smart phone allows the employee to 
complete tasks much faster.  This idea goes back to the cost-benefit 
analysis discussed earlier.165  Based strictly on the judge-made time 
constraints, the de minimis doctrine would eliminate compensation for 
writing an e-mail in under ten minutes with no examination of the 
benefits the employer received. 
In a de minimis doctrine situation the court may have to look beyond 
the employee’s time and look into the substantive effects of the 
                                                     
 162. Id. at 66. 
 163. Amanda (Amy) M. Riley, The De Minimis Rule: Trifles of Time, 45 ORANGE COUNTY 
LAW. 18, 18 (2003). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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employee’s smart-phone use.166  It is unfair to not compensate an 
employee who used a smart phone during off-duty time to set up 
meetings that led to new business because the time spent was in small 
amounts that failed to pass the de minimis doctrine.167  Curing such 
unfairness would require looking exactly at the type of work the 
employee did rather than looking only at the compensable time 
claimed.168  Evidence of substantive smart-phone use is potentially more 
accurate than attempting to calculate time because the focus would be on 
tangible content and its impact on the employer.  A look at the content of 
the smart-phone use could also provide evidence that the employee’s 
work was frivolous or insubstantial and properly falls under the de 
minimis doctrine.  A look at the substantive aspects of smart-phone use 
is important because, even today, the de minimis doctrine is discussed in 
regards to small tasks like turning on lights, starting equipment, and 
opening the office.169  Substantive and beneficial smart-phone use should 
not be put into the same category as flipping switches and turning on 
machines. 
The de minimis doctrine is also addressed specifically to preliminary 
and postliminary work done at the employer’s premises.  The facts of 
Lindow can be distinguished from potential smart-phone claims because 
the case addressed the seconds and minutes of labor done directly before 
or after regularly scheduled work while the employee was still on the 
premises.170  Additionally, the Lindow case involved workers claiming 
overtime for the fifteen minutes before work on the employer’s 
premises.171  The smart phone, however, is inherently designed to allow 
an employee to work while away from the office.  This is a 
distinguishing factor that may make the de minimis doctrine 
inappropriate in the smart-phone context because most potential smart-
phone claims will involve time spent at home or on the road but not in 
the office.  However, the Lindow test’s first inquiry intends to eliminate 
administrative impracticalities, and the smart phone presents a great deal 
                                                     
 166. See Eric Phillips, Note, On-Call Time Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 2633, 2645 (“In fact, the value of the service to the employer was an important consideration in 
Congress’s establishment of the minimum wage.”). 
 167. Id. at 2644 (arguing that the courts should also examine the benefit to the employer which 
is “consistent with Supreme Court precedent and with the equitable concerns that were central to the 
passage of the FLSA”). 
 168. Id. at 2654 (“The objective character of the on-call duty, not the employee’s or the 
employer’s characterization of it, should be the central concern.”). 
 169. Determining Hours Worked, Part III, 2007 PAYROLL PRAC. MONTHLY 1, 10 [hereinafter 
Determining Hours Worked]. 
 170. Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 171. Id. at 1063–64. 
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of administrative problems.  Thus the de minimis doctrine is still an 
appropriate place to look when addressing smart-phone claims, but 
courts may have to expand the inquiry beyond just time. 
b. The Second Factor of the Lindow Test 
The second factor of the Lindow test is to “consider . . . the aggregate 
amount of compensable time.”172  The de minimis doctrine allows the 
aggregation of minimal claims that were done on a daily basis.173  The 
courts were worried about the inherent unfairness of awarding one 
employee $50 for one week’s worth of overtime but not giving any 
compensation to an employee who earns $1 a week for fifty weeks.174  
Does this mean that an employee who checks his smart phone for work 
e-mail (assuming that the court finds it constitutes compensable work) 
for one minute, five times an evening while at home can aggregate this 
time as compensable work to receive twenty-five minutes of overtime for 
the week?  Allowing aggregation has two separate implications: (1) it 
creates the potential for employee abuse or (2) it is helpful in fairly 
compensating employees for work that would otherwise be de minimis. 
First, employees can too easily aggregate time on a smart phone with 
little to no effort.  Allowing workers to aggregate brief e-mail checks 
would open up employers to countless hours of unexpected compensable 
time.  Employers should be specifically concerned with the 
recommendation that overtime calculations should be rounded to the 
“nearest five minutes, one-tenth or quarter hour.”175  Rounding in 
addition to aggregation would significantly increase the amount of 
compensable time claimed.  For example, three minutes a day for ten 
days is thirty minutes of compensable time but rounding three minutes to 
five minutes for ten days increases the total to fifty minutes of 
compensable time.  The discrepancy would only increase with longer 
aggregation, as would the potential liability for the employer.  As 
mentioned in regards to the first prong of the Lindow test, the Supreme 
Court stated in dicta that the de minimis doctrine was intended to make 
sure employers were not compensating workers for small amounts of 
time that the Court considered a “trifle.”176  Some courts have followed  
 
                                                     
 172. Id. at 1063. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Riley, supra note 163, at 19. 
 176. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946). 
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this idea and dismissed insubstantial aggregate claims as groundless and 
unreasonable.177 
Alternatively, aggregation may be an appropriate context when 
looking at potential smart-phone claims.  Strictly applying the ten-minute 
common law rule from the de minimis doctrine may unfairly eliminate 
an employee’s claim for overtime without examining if it should be 
compensable.  Fairness is an important aspect of allowing aggregation.178  
As discussed above, significant and substantive work can be 
accomplished on a smart phone in the amount of time the courts consider 
de minimis.  Employees, however, should not be denied compensation 
for using a smart phone to quickly take care of work while off-duty if the 
work provided a benefit to the employer.  In a court that strictly follows 
the de minimis doctrine, aggregation may be the only way an employee 
can pursue a smart-phone claim because the employee’s time spent using 
the smart phone falls under ten minutes.  The burden still rests with the 
employee to produce evidence that the smart-phone use was not an 
“isolated incident[] or [a] small amount[] of overtime on a sporadic 
basis.”179  If the employee is able to meet this burden, the general feeling 
is “repeated days of de minimis overtime are unquestionably 
compensable.”180  Aggregation is an important factor for both the 
employee and the employer to note when evaluating a smart-phone claim 
because it could potentially make an employee’s claim viable or 
exponentially increase an employer’s liability. 
Since mentioning the de minimis doctrine in dicta, the Supreme 
Court has not fully defined the rule.181  In the absence of an official 
ruling, the DOL issued a memorandum taking the position that “discrete 
periods of time which the employer classifies as de minimis must be 
aggregated, and when aggregated the total time spent may not meet the 
de minimis standard.”182  The implication is that a court may find certain 
activities are de minimis, but because they are required to be aggregated, 
the total time exceeds the de minimis standard, which weakens the effect 
                                                     
 177. Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1063. 
 178. See Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F.2d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1953) (“To disregard 
workweeks for which less than a dollar is due will produce capricious and unfair results.”). 
 179. Riley, supra note 163, at 18. 
 180. Id. at 19. 
 181. Lynn M. Carroll, Comment, Employment Law—Fair Labor Standards Act Requires 
Compensation for Employees Walking To and From Workstations—IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 126 S. Ct. 
514 (2005), 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 769, 776 (2007). 
 182. Ellen C. Kearns, The De Minimis Doctrine, 2006 A.L.I.—A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: 
ADVANCED EMP. L. LITIG. 709, 720. 
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of the de minimis doctrine.183  Consequently, the de minimis doctrine 
may not have any effect in a smart-phone claim because the time spent 
will be automatically aggregated and compensable because the 
aggregated amount of time exceeds the de minimis standards.184 
c. The Third Factor of the Lindow Test 
The third factor of the Lindow test is to “consider . . . the regularity 
of the additional work.”185  This test, like the second prong of the Lindow 
test, has two separate implications.  First, in most cases, it is not very 
hard for employees to regularly check their smart phone while off-duty.  
The ease with which an employee can check a smart phone to create 
work was certainly not envisioned when the de minimis doctrine was 
established.186  Employees can create regularity on their own, possibly 
defeating the impact of this aspect of the Lindow test.  Just as courts take 
into account fairness to the employee, it would be unfair to the employer 
for an employee to artificially create regular work in order to receive 
overtime compensation.  Again, the de minimis doctrine was intended to 
eliminate “trifle” claims of compensable work, and regular checking of 
the smart phone cannot raise the activity above a “trifle.” 
Second, the third prong provides an additional avenue for the court 
to judge an employee’s smart-phone claim on factors other than time.187  
As mentioned above, strict readings of the ten-minute rule may eliminate 
a compensable smart-phone claim but the outcome may change if the 
court takes into account the regularity of the employee’s use of the smart 
phone.  The regularity aspect can be proven either through evidence of 
explicit instructions from the employer regarding off-duty work or 
through an office culture that implicitly requires employees to stay in 
regular contact with the office even while off-duty.  In smart-phone 
cases, regularity can be quantified by looking at the number of e-mails 
sent, the amount of data sent, or phone-call logs.  The inquiry into the 
                                                     
 183. See id. (stating the DOL’s position “significantly diminishes the effect of a de minimis 
finding, and may in fact mean that de minimis findings will be rare indeed”). 
 184. Id. (stating aggregated working time is compensable when it exceeds the de minimis 
standard). 
 185. Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 186. See Daniel V. Yager & Sandra J. Boyd, Reinventing the Fair Labor Standards Act to 
Support the Reengineered Workplace, 11 LAB. LAW. 321, 322 (1995) (“It is difficult to believe that 
it is sound policy for Depression-era wage and hour laws to govern the workplace of the twenty first 
century.”). 
 187. See Determing Hours Worked, supra note 169 at 10 (“The regularity or frequency of the 
time periods is a consideration.”). 
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regularity with which the work was performed takes the focus off strictly 
looking at time spent working. 
Even with the factors set forth above, a de minimis doctrine inquiry 
must focus on determining the nature of the employee’s work.  Merely 
scrolling through e-mail on a smart phone should fall into the category 
the de minimis doctrine attempts to eliminate from compensable work.  
In contrast, writing reply e-mails involves much more exertion on the 
employee’s part.  An employee writing reply e-mails on a regular basis 
while off-duty could be aggregated to form a significant overtime claim.  
This necessarily follows from the reasoning set forth above, which 
concludes it would be unfair to compensate an employee for staying one 
hour after work to e-mail clients and not to compensate an employee who 
spent one hour spread over four weeks e-mailing clients. 
More importantly, the potential for abuse, the probable lack of 
sufficient evidence, and the courts’ focus on fairness makes it imperative 
for the employer to develop policies and procedures rather than rely on 
the de minimis doctrine to eliminate smart-phone claims.  A major aspect 
of smart-phone claims would be the evidence provided because a lack of 
sufficient evidence is a detriment to the employee and employer.  To 
address the potential lack of evidence, employers could require all non-
exempt employees to copy their managers when sending off-duty e-
mails, which would form a practical basis for computing the overtime 
work because the employer would have a record of the work performed.  
Employers, however, are better off developing preventive policies 
addressing an employee’s use of a smart phone while off-duty.  Courts 
routinely rely on “contract terms, custom, or practice” when attempting 
to compute compensable work in situations where it is impossible to 
determine precise numbers.188  A smart-phone claim is likely to involve a 
substantial amount of difficulty in computing hours worked, which 
makes contracts, custom, or practice particularly important.  It is likely 
courts will use the de minimis doctrine to examine a smart-phone claim, 
but the potential outcome will be highly dependent upon the available 
evidence and facts.  Facts analogous to a potential smart-phone claim 
have yet to be tested in the courts and attorneys who deal in employment 
matters are quick to point out that courts may not follow the de minimis 
rules as expected.189 
                                                     
 188. See WAGES & HOURS, supra note 157, § 6.02(2)(d). 
 189. Foulston Siefkin LLP, Employees Walk Away with High Court Victory, KAN. EMP. L. 
LETTER Dec. 2005, at 2; Riley, supra note 163, at 19.  See also Carroll, supra note 181, at 776 
(stating the Supreme Court “failed to fully define the scope of . . . the de minimis rule”). 
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2. The Portal-to-Portal Act’s Effect on Smart-Phone Claims 
The Portal-to-Portal Act was another attempt to limit the broad 
definition of work and stop the creation of “unexpected liabilities” for 
companies.190  The applicable portion of the Portal-to-Portal Act 
eliminates liability for “activities which are preliminary to or 
postliminary to [the employee’s] principal activity or activities.”191  The 
Portal-to-Portal Act also gives effect to express provisions of contracts, 
written or nonwritten, and to customs and practices.192  The Portal-to-
Portal Act provides an important analytical framework for examining 
potential smart-phone claims because it takes into account the 
substantive content of the work rather than only looking at time like the 
de minimis doctrine. 
The section of the Portal-to-Portal Act eliminating liability for 
preliminary and postliminary work not related to the principal activity 
requires a court to look at the content of the employee’s smart-phone use.  
This is similar to the approach suggested earlier, which argued that the 
de minimis doctrine’s application to smart-phone use must also look at 
the substantive content of the work in addition to strictly looking at the 
time.193  In most cases, using a smart phone to write an e-mail to a client 
or to review documents is related to the principal activity of the 
employee, but using the smart phone while off duty to look for 
restaurants or to shop would be unrelated to the principal activity.  This 
distinction is relatively easy to grasp with adequate evidence. 
An employer can further challenge smart-phone claims on the basis 
of the claim’s relationship to the employee’s principal activity.  In this 
instance, a court looks at whether or not the work was “‘integral and 
indispensable’ to the principal activity.”194  Work-related e-mails may be 
related to work, but the “integral and indispensable” requirement needs 
to be addressed to determine the legitimacy of the smart-phone claims.  
In interpreting the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Steiner Court determined “the 
principal activity of battery production could not be accomplished 
without protecting employees from toxic chemicals, the protective 
measures were integral and indispensable to, and therefore a part of, that 
principal activity.”195  The industrial setting provides a clearer line 
                                                     
 190. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 253 (1956). 
 191. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2) (2006). 
 192. Id. § 254(b)(1)–(2). 
 193. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 194. Neville F. Dastoor & Shane T. Muñoz, IBP v. Alvarez, FLA. B.J., Feb. 2006, at 37, 37. 
 195. Id. at 37–38. 
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between what is and what is not an “integral and indispensable” activity, 
but the intent of the ruling can be applied to smart-phone claims.  Using 
a smart phone to set up important client meetings may be “integral and 
indispensable,” while using a smart phone to purchase work supplies 
may not be “integral and indispensable.”196  As such, a court’s inquiry 
would be fact-intensive to ensure a claim for overtime was related to the 
employee’s principal activities. 
The fact-intensive inquiry highlights a potential problem with the 
application of the Portal-to-Portal Act to smart-phone claims.  The main 
problem is that the Portal-to-Portal Act was interpreted in an industrial 
setting and has been applied to activities like driving to work, walking to 
work, or activities taking place immediately before and after work.197  
Smart-phone claims can be distinguished because the compensable 
claims will often occur well after the employee has left the employer’s 
premises.  Even its name seems to suggest that the Act addresses the act 
of entering and leaving the employer’s premises.  The Portal-to-Portal 
Act, however, does place an emphasis on looking at the content of the 
work in relation to its importance to the employer and the employee’s 
activities.198  Following this approach, courts may want to look into the 
substantive content of potential smart-phone claims before deeming them 
compensable. 
Another important aspect for employers is the Portal-to-Portal Act’s 
rules on recognizing contracts and customs and practices addressing the 
compensation for overtime.199  The recognition of a contract places the 
responsibility on the employer to make sure they address potential issues 
knowing they have a statutory assurance the contracts will be recognized 
under the FLSA.  It is also important for employees because a contract 
can allow compensation for activities that would normally be 
excluded.200  Furthermore, the customs and practices aspect could play a 
pivotal role.  Custom and practice recognition, however, is limited to a 
particular employer’s customs or practices, and any industry custom is 
                                                     
 196. See Rachael Langston, IBP v. Alvarez: Reconciling the FLSA with the Portal-to-Portal Act, 
27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 545, 552 (2006) (arguing courts have not consistently defined what 
is “integral and indispensable” to the principal activity). 
 197. WAGES & HOURS, supra note 157, § 6.02(2)(a)–(b). 
 198. See Langston, supra note 196, at 551 (“The Court concluded by stating that to characterize 
as a primary activity an activity that is two steps away from the actual productive activity of 
employment would expand employer liability in exactly the manner that Congress intended the PPA 
to prevent.”). 
 199. See WAGES & HOURS, supra note 157, § 6.02(2)(b); cf. Phillips, supra note 166, at 2649 
(arguing that allowing employers to contract around on-call time contradicts the FLSA). 
 200. WAGES & HOURS, supra note 157, § 6.02(2)(d). 
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irrelevant in determining compensation for hours worked.201  This 
limitation allows courts to account for an office culture that emphasizes 
off-duty work and keeping in constant contact with the office.  
Additionally, an employment contract or bargaining agreement can 
render any employer custom irrelevant in determining compensation.202  
This only serves to reinforce the idea of employers taking preventative 
measures to ensure employees know which activities will be 
compensated and which will not be compensated. 
The Portal-to-Portal Act continues the trend of creating limitations to 
the FLSA’s broad definition of “work.”  First, the Act emphasizes the 
general feeling that not everything done relating to work should be 
compensated.  Second, the Act’s “principal activity” requirements aim to 
eliminate any liability owed to a non-exempt employee whose claims are 
based solely on being required to have a smart phone or for using the 
smart phone for non-business activities.  Third, the Act provides a 
framework for analyzing the substantive content of an employee’s 
overtime claim rather than just looking at the time spent.  Finally, the Act 
highlights the legal importance of employers developing preventative 
measures. 
3. The Impact of On-Call Case Precedent on Smart-Phone Claims 
On-call cases are particularly helpful in analyzing smart-phone 
claims because both have the common aspect of the employee being in 
constant contact with the employer.  Additionally, like smart-phone 
claims, the FLSA does not explicitly address on-call time.203  The 
Supreme Court developed two inquiries relevant in on-call cases: (1) 
“whether an employee is ‘engaged to wait’ or ‘waiting to be engaged’” 
or (2) “whether on-call time is spent predominantly for the benefit of the 
employer or the employee.”204  Both inquiries are “individualized and 
fact-based.”205 
Typical on-call arrangements involve some restrictions on workers’ 
at-home activities.206  The “engaged to wait” versus “waiting to be 
                                                     
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  See also Phillips, supra note 166, at 2636 (“In light of the predominantly factual basis 
of the question raised in on-call cases, a mechanical test likely cannot resolve the issue.  Courts 
therefore must examine all the circumstances involved in the on-call arrangement.”). 
 206. See Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary’s Hosps., Inc., 164 F.3d 1056, 1057 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(noting on-call employees must live within a seven-minute radius of the hospital, cannot consume 
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engaged” inquiry turns on “the degree to which the burden on the 
employee interferes with his or her personal pursuits.”207  When on-call 
duty heavily restricts an employee’s personal activities the courts weigh 
this in favor of the time being compensable.208  However, “[a]n employee 
who is not required to remain on the employer’s premises but is merely 
required to leave word at home or with company officials where he or 
she may be reached is not working while on call.”209  There are three 
relevant factors that the court can look at to determine the burden on the 
employee: “the number of times an employee is interrupted or called 
back to work; . . . the duration of the callbacks and interruptions; and . . . 
the amount of time an employee has before he must return to work.”210  
These factors should all be taken into account to determine if the burden 
is compensable, but it is possible for one factor to be particularly 
burdensome and, therefore, compensable by itself.211 
When analyzing the burden, the courts look at the number of calls an 
on-call employee receives and the time spent on each call, and the more 
calls an employee receives the more likely the time is compensable.212  
The employee is being interrupted each time the employee answers a call 
or e-mail.  Frequent interruptions signify a burden on the employee 
because the employee cannot engage in off-duty activities.213  This 
analysis can be used in smart-phone claims because quantifiable statistics 
should be available.  In addition to calls and call time, the court can look 
at the number of e-mails sent and received while off-duty. 
The court should also examine the length of the interruptions.  The 
longer the interruption, the less time an employee has for personal 
activities and the more likely the time will be viewed as compensable.214  
An interruption that merely requires a quick answer from an employee is 
less of a burden.215  This idea seems similar to the de minimis doctrine.  
As such, quick answers may not be compensable as single incidents but 
could be aggregated into compensable time. 
                                                                                                                       
alcohol, and cannot engage in activities that would impair their ability to hear their pager such as 
lawn mowing or attending concerts). 
 207. Selected Labor & Employment Law Updates, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 355, 356 (2001). 
 208. Dinges, 164 F.3d at 1058. 
 209. Id. (quoting DOL regulations in 29 C.F.R. § 553.221(d)). 
 210. Phillips, supra note 166, at 2641. 
 211. Id. (“When one element is especially burdensome, however, it may by itself compel 
compensation.”). 
 212. Fuss, supra note 130, at 454. 
 213. Phillips, supra note 166, at 2641. 
 214. Id. at 2642. 
 215. Id. 
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The final factor looks at the response time the employer requires, and 
it is argued that a short response time weighs in favor of 
compensation.216  In a smart-phone claim, the court could look at 
whether the employer required the employee to respond to off-duty e-
mails or allowed them to answer the e-mails the next day at work.  
Additionally, requiring on-call employees to constantly monitor and 
respond all day weighs heavily in favor of compensability.217  In this 
instance, an employee is acting entirely for the benefit of the employer.  
Requiring an employee to use his smart phone to promptly reply to any 
e-mails sent after work would likely make the work compensable 
because the employee would have to constantly monitor his smart phone 
while off duty.218  These employer requirements would most likely 
restrict the employee’s ability to use his time effectively for personal 
activities, eliminating any benefit to the employee. 
Despite many similarities, there is a distinction between on-call duty 
and smart-phone use.  On-call duty typically requires the employee leave 
his house and return to the office or work site, but smart-phone use can 
be done while an employee is sitting at home.  Therefore, the physical 
burden of on-call duty is probably much greater than the physical burden 
any smart-phone user would experience.  However, this does not mean 
smart-phone users are not working, but it means the court’s inquiry 
necessarily returns to determining if the employee’s use of the smart 
phone constitutes compensable work.  The on-call cases provide a 
helpful framework for employers looking to develop policies on off-duty 
smart-phone use. 
C. Potential Solutions for Employers 
Employment attorneys caution employers against relying on courts 
interpreting wage-and-hour cases in a predictable and favorable 
manner.219  The de minimis doctrine, Portal-to-Portal Act, and on-call 
cases may not provide on-point precedent to deal with potential smart-
phone litigation, but they do highlight the importance of developing 
preventative policies and what should be included in those policies.220  
                                                     
 216. Fuss, supra note 130, at 454–55. 
 217. Pabst v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 228 F.3d 1128, 1134 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 218. See Phillips, supra note 166, at 2642 (“Like the requirement that an employee remain on 
the employer’s premises while on call, a short response time can restrict the activities an employee 
may pursue while on call.”). 
 219. Foulston Siefkin LLP, supra note 189, at 2, 3; see Riley, supra note 163, at 19 (noting the 
de minimis rule appears yet to be tested at the local level and, therefore, kept flexible). 
 220. See MODEL CORPORATE POLICY, supra note 128, at 2 (“Company communication tools are 
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The first step any employer should take is to analyze the need for non-
exempt employees to have smart phones.  Prohibiting non-exempt 
employees from accessing company-issued smart phones effectively 
eliminates the potential for most wage-and-hour litigation.  From a 
practical standpoint, non-exempt workers will not have smart-phone 
access on which to base a claim.  The prohibition also establishes 
evidence of an employer’s custom and practice of not expecting or 
intending to have non-exempt workers use smart phones, which was 
recognized as significant evidence in the Portal-to-Portal Act.221  If this is 
not possible, the employer should focus on communicating with the 
employees orally and through contract regarding overtime expectations 
and limitations.222  Employers should consider requiring that all 
employees receive approval to work overtime.223  This would allow 
employers to have more control of employee overtime and prevent 
employees from performing unnecessary but compensable work while 
off-duty.  Additionally, it provides further evidence of the employer’s 
customs and practices.  Employers, however, cannot contract around 
paying employees for compensable work.224 
If an employer determines that it must give non-exempt employees 
access to smart phones, then the employer should consider requiring the 
employee to sign a contract detailing the expectations, requirements, and 
compensation policies regarding smart-phone use.225  Contracts and 
bargaining agreements explicitly inform the employee of smart-phone 
policies and supersede any company customs and practices.226  Contracts 
should address how the employer wants the employee to use the smart 
phone.  The contract could state specific times for using the smart phone, 
provide the employer’s expectations for responding to calls and e-mails 
received after regular work hours, and set up guidelines for how to 
properly record off-duty smart-phone use.  The contract should also 
attempt to limit all unwanted employee overtime.  Employers may want 
                                                                                                                       
just that—they belong to the Company.  Use of these communication tools is permitted in order to 
further the Company’s legitimate business interests.  Ownership of the communication tools permits 
the Company to recover possession, and to set conditions and regulations on their use.”). 
 221. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 222. Perkins Coie, supra note 88, at 5. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Phillips, supra note 166, at 2651 (stating “nothing in the [FLSA] text suggests that an 
employer may contract around the requirement that all employees receive compensation for work”). 
 225. MODEL CORPORATE POLICY, supra note 128, at 1 (stating an electronic communications 
policy serves three purposes: protection of the company; prevention of losses, errors, and mistakes; 
and education of employees “to better-inform employees about not-well-understood risks that exist 
in an electronic environment”). 
 226. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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to require that employees report all smart-phone use on a weekly basis, 
which would allow employers to monitor smart-phone use and control it 
if necessary.  The weekly reporting would also prevent the employer 
from being blindsided by a large overtime claim.  However, even a well-
written contract cannot entirely eliminate overtime claims.227  As such, 
the contract should also focus on creating a practical recording system 
for smart-phone use, which would be important if litigation were to arise.  
The recording system may not eliminate the overtime claim, but it could 
help provide sufficient evidence to prove the proper amount of 
compensable time and save both the employer and employee time and 
money. 
The preventative policies and procedures may not insulate an 
employer from liability, but the policies and procedures can serve as 
fundamental evidence in wage-and-hour claims, which are very fact 
intensive.228  The smart phone may provide ample opportunity for 
employees to create frivolous claims, but many employees will have 
legitimate claims for compensable work.  An employer with well-
developed policies and procedures and an effective overtime recording 
system will be able to counter frivolous claims and avoid being surprised 
by legitimate claims.  The more evidence the employer and employees 
can produce, the greater the likelihood of a fair result for both sides. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s broad definition of “work” theoretically allows 
many activities to qualify as compensable.  This creates potential liability 
for employers who provide or allow non-exempt employees to use their 
smart phones for work-related duties outside of the office.  While the 
FLSA was designed to ensure workers receive fair compensation and 
prevent employers from taking advantage of employees, the Court’s 
interpretation went beyond these protections.  Furthermore, the FLSA 
was written and the seminal cases interpreting the Act were decided at a 
                                                     
 227. Phillips, supra note 166, at 2652 (“The Congress that passed the FLSA clearly intended to 
protect against unfair and unreasonable agreements that did not meet the minimum requirements of 
the Act . . . .”); see Perkins Coie, supra note 88, at 5 (“[Y]ou still may be liable for the overtime pay 
if you knew or had reason to know that the employee was working from home.  Under the FLSA, 
you must pay employees overtime for any hours worked over 40 in a workweek, regardless of 
whether the employee works at the office or at home.”). 
 228. Employers should remain aware of FLSA standards when contracting with employees 
because the fact-intensive inquiry may look into the equity of the contract.  Bargaining power in 
employee-employer relationships tends to favor the employer.  As such, there may be an agreement 
between the two parties, but it may not meet FLSA standards.  The Supreme Court has determined 
that contracts cannot be used to “supersede the FLSA.”  Phillips, supra note 166, at 2652. 
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time when work usually had to be done on the production line, in a mine, 
or at least in the office.  Neither the FLSA nor the Court envisioned the 
ease with which workers could work in the twenty-first century, 
especially the ease with which employees could accumulate substantial 
overtime hours from the comfort of their homes.  As such, it is important 
to recognize the Court’s emphasis on interpreting the FLSA through 
practical industrial realities.  The reality of smart phones is that they can 
help workers be more productive and more connected with work, but at 
the same time they can be used to accumulate substantial amounts of 
overtime with little effort if the right policies and procedures are not in 
place to protect the employers. 
Smart-phone inquiries will require an intense look at the facts to 
determine if the use qualifies as compensable work.  For example, 
carrying a smart phone and giving it a quick glance to check for e-mails 
does not constitute compensable work, but writing an e-mail to a client, 
reviewing a document for a manager, or researching an issue for work 
probably constitute compensable work when done outside of the office.  
The de minimis doctrine, the Portal-to-Portal Act, and the on-call case 
law all provide ways for the courts to interpret potential smart-phone 
claims.  These three limitations provide an analytical framework for 
courts to evaluate smart-phone claims and, hopefully, separate the 
legitimate claims from the frivolous ones.  Employers can use these 
limitations to understand what may be important in wage-and-hour 
claims and to develop policies and procedures that can limit liability.  
Employers, however, will not be able to completely eliminate the 
potential for litigation on smart-phone claims. 
The FLSA and courts maintain a focus on fair treatment of workers.  
This focus almost guarantees a claim will go to trial because a non-
exempt employee will eventually have favorable facts that indicate the 
employee was not compensated for off-duty work.  Employers cannot 
rely upon the judicial and congressional limitations or the practical 
realities of industry.  Instead, employers must actively seek to eliminate 
the potential for liability by eliminating smart phones for non-exempt 
workers, setting strict guidelines on their use through written contracts, 
and creating an office culture that diminishes any pressure to perform 
overtime work.  Even the best-planned policies cannot prevent a lawsuit, 
but they can serve as important evidence at trial and preempt some non-
exempt employees from using their smart phones after work. 
